Medimmune v. Genentech: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Continued Assault on the Patentee by Smith, Nicholas G.
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review
Volume 15 | Issue 2 Article 9
Medimmune v. Genentech: A Game-Theoretic
Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Continued Assault
on the Patentee
Nicholas G. Smith
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Nicholas G. Smith, Medimmune v. Genentech: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Continued Assault on the Patentee, 15
Intellectual Property L. Rev. 503 (2011).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr/vol15/iss2/9




Medimmune v. Genentech: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 





I.  BACKGROUND............................................................................................506 
A.  The Federal Circuit’s Reasonable Apprehension Standard .........506 
B.  MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. ............................................508 
C.  Federal Circuit’s Response to MedImmune ..................................510 
1.  SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc. ............................511 
2.  Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Novartis 
Pharmaceutical Corp. ............................................................512 
II.  MODEL......................................................................................................513 
A.  Introduction...................................................................................513 
B.  Assumptions...................................................................................513 
C.  The Players....................................................................................514 
D.  Strategies and Pay-Offs ................................................................515 
1.  Patentee...................................................................................516 
a.  Do Nothing ........................................................................516 
b.  Challenge ..........................................................................517 
2.  Licensee ..................................................................................518 
a.  Do Nothing ........................................................................519 
b.  Challenge ..........................................................................519 
E. Bi-Matrix ........................................................................................521 
III. ANALYSIS..............................................................................................522 
A.  Probability of Invalidity is Zero Percent ......................................522 
B.  Probability of Invalidity is Ten Percent ........................................523 
C.  Probability of Invalidity is Fifty Percent.......................................524 
D.  Probability of Invalidity is Seventy-five Percent...........................525 
E.  Probability of Invalidity is One-hundred Percent .........................526 





SMITH_COMMENT (8).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/2011  3:29:04 PM 
504  MARQUETTE I.P. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:2 
 
ABSTRACT 
 In 2007, the Supreme Court decided MedImmune v. Genentech.  This 
decision changed the landscape of the patent licensing field by holding that a 
licensee in good standing may challenge the validity of a patent in a 
declaratory judgment action.  By adding to the cost of entering a license 
agreement, MedImmune erodes one characteristic of a patent from which it 
derives its worth—the patent’s ability to be licensed.  Unfortunately, this has 
decreased the incentive to innovate by decreasing the value of a patent.  This 
Comment seeks to illustrate, using a game theoretic model, how MedImmune 
will increase litigation against patent licensors, which in turn will increase the 
risk of entering a license agreement and decrease the value of a patent. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1982, with the Federal Courts Improvement Act, Congress created the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  The Federal Circuit was created, in 
part, as a response to the Supreme Court’s neglect of the patent field.1  Thus, 
one can say it was designed to give life to patent law by serving as an expert, 
specialized court that provides competency and unity to national patent law.  
Initially, the Supreme Court’s withdrawal became even more evident after the 
creation of the Federal Circuit.  This caused one author to declare in 2001 that 
the “Federal Circuit . . . has become the de facto supreme court of patents.”2 
Things changed in 2001.3  The Supreme Court began to grant certiorari to 
an exceedingly larger amount of patent cases.  In the nineteen years of the 
Federal Circuit’s life before 2001, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to only 
eleven patent cases (an average of .58 cases per term), which addressed 
substantive issues of patent law.  From 2001 to 2011, almost half the time, the 
Supreme Court will have decided twelve substantive patent cases (an average of 
1.3 cases per term).4  These decisions have been largely considered anti-
 
1.  One academic observed that “[p]atents do not bulk large in the present business of the 
Supreme Court,” and the Court had “relegated the resolution of patent controversies to the lower levels 
of the federal judiciary.”  Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court and Patents and Monopolies xii 
(1975). 
2.  Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
387, 387 (2001).   
3.  Scholars often cite the decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 
535 U.S. 722 (2002) as the decision that marked the Supreme Court’s return to patent law.  See, e.g., 
John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return to the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 
SUP. CT. REV. 273 (2002). 
4.  Id.; Three cases have been granted certiorari for next term: Microsoft Corp. v. i4i L.P., No. 
10-290, 2010 WL 3392402 (U.S., Nov. 29, 2010); Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. 
Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., No. 09-1159, 2010 WL 1180644 (U.S., November 01, 2010); Tech 
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., No. 10-6, 2010 WL 2629783 (U.S., Oct. 12,  2010).  Notably, this will tie 
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patentee.5  Therefore, one could say that if the Federal Circuit gives life to the 
patentee, the Supreme Court is where the patentee goes to die. 
Part of this trend was the Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc.,6 which, in an eight-to-one decision, made it easier for patent 
licensees to challenge the validity of a patent it is licensing.7  The Court held 
that a licensee does not have to break the license agreement and risk being 
assessed breach of contract damages before filing a declaratory judgment 
action.8 It reasoned that an Article III controversy exists, with regards to a 
declaratory judgment action, when “the facts alleged, under all the 
circumstances, show there is a substantial controversy between the parties 
having adverse legal interest, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant 
the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”9  Previously, the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit had articulated a more stringent standard for 
declaratory judgment actions involving patent claims: whether there was a 
reasonable apprehension of suit (RAS).10  Under the RAS test, there must be 
(1) action(s) by the patent holder, which gives rise to a reasonable 
apprehension of an infringement suit against the declaratory judgment 
plaintiffs; and (2) action(s) by the declaratory judgment plaintiff that could 
constitute infringement.  In sum, the Supreme Court stomped out the RAS 
doctrine in favor of a lesser standard. 
The purpose of this Comment will be to examine the effects of 
MedImmune on both the patentee and licensee by deploying a game theoretic 
model.  By doing so, this Comment seeks to shed light on when and how 
MedImmune affects the relationship of a licensee and a patentee by analyzing 
the landscape of the parties’ respective strategic concerns. 
 
2007 as the term with the most patent law cases decided since the creation of the Federal Circuit.   
5.  See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (raised the standard of 
inventiveness); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (limited a patentee’s ability to 
see injunctive relief); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007) (limited the geographic 
reach of infringement liability); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc. 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008) 
(expanded scope of exhaustion doctrine); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 
(2005) (expanded experimental use defense); MedImmune v. Genentech, 549 U.S. 118 (2007) 
(lowering the standard for declaratory judgment standing). 
6.  MedImmune v. Genentech, 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
7. Id. at 137. 
8.  Id. 
9.  Id.  at 127 (quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 
(1941)). 
10.  See, e.g., Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Cordis Corp. v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 780 F.2d 991 (Fed. Cir. 1985); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 879–80 
(Fed. Cir. 1983). 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
This Section will examine the necessary background case law to identify 
the strategic concerns that now affect both patentees and licensees.  First, the 
Federal Circuit’s Reasonable Apprehension standard will be cursorily 
discussed.  Second, the Supreme Court’s dismantling of this standard in 
MedImmune v. Genentech will be examined.  Finally, the Federal Circuit’s 
response to MedImmune will be analyzed. 
A.  The Federal Circuit’s Reasonable Apprehension Standard 
The Declaratory Judgment Act does not create federal jurisdiction.11  
Subject matter jurisdiction must exist first because of a federal question or 
diversity.12  In addition to having subject matter jurisdiction, the courts have 
required an actual controversy to exist between the parties.13 
In a declaratory judgment action the plaintiff has the burden of proof in 
establishing that an actual controversy exists as a matter of law.14  For patents, 
the plaintiff must meet a two-part standard by showing “(1) an explicit threat 
or other action by the patentee, which creates a reasonable apprehension on 
the part of the declaratory plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and 
(2) present activity which could constitute infringement or concrete steps 
taken with the intent to conduct such activity.”15  The first prong looks to the 
conduct of the plaintiff, the alleged infringer; while the second prong looks at 
the conduct of the defendant, the patentee.16 
 
11.  Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).   
 
The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, in its limitation to “cases of actual 
controversy,” manifestly has regard to the constitutional provision and is 
operative only in respect to controversies which are such in the constitutional 
sense.  The word “actual” is one of emphasis rather than of definition.  Thus the 
operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only.  In providing 
remedies and defining procedure in relation to cases and controversies in the 
constitutional sense the Congress is acting within its delegated power over the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts which the Congress is authorized to establish. 
Id.  
12.  Id. 
13.  Interpretive case law of the Declaratory Judgment Act is seemingly wary of giving the 
Act independent procedural teeth because of the courts’ reluctance to give advisory opinions.  
Michael Weinstein, The Fate of the Federal Circuit’s “Reasonable Apprehension” Standard in 
Patent Suits For Declaratory Judgment Following MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 
764 (2007), 76 U. CIN.  L. REV. 681, 683 (2008). 
14.  Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 888 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  
15.  BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
16.  Id.    
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The first prong is a safeguard against courts making advisory opinions.17  
It analyzes whether the plaintiff is either engaged in conduct that may amount 
to infringement or is taking meaningful and preparatory steps to what will 
likely constitute infringing actions.18  To satisfy this standard, courts look to 
how imminent the infringing actions are,19 and whether this infringing 
conduct is sufficiently definite to constitute infringement.20 
The second prong inquires whether the plaintiff, the accused infringer, 
reasonably believes the patentee will initiate suit.21 This is an objective 
standard; the subjective belief of the plaintiff is insufficient.22 
Courts have relied on several factors when evaluating whether a plaintiff 
is in reasonable apprehension of a suit: the patentee’s litigation history,23 the 
 
17.  See Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988); 
Wembley, Inc. v. Superba Cravats, Inc., 315 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1963). 
18.  Int’l Harvester Co. v. Deere & Co., 623 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1980). 
19.  Sierra Applied Scis., Inc. v. Advanced Energy Indus., 363 F.3d 1361, 1378 (2004). 
20.  See Id.  “This approach is proper: The greater the variability of the subject of a 
declaratory-judgment suit, particularly as to its potentially infringing features, the greater the chance 
that the court's judgment will be purely advisory, detached from the eventual, actual content of that 
subject—in short, detached from eventual reality.”  Id.  
 
Our concern is not that the [product at issue] will never be produced, but rather 
that because of the relatively early stage of its development, the design which is 
before us now may not be the design which is ultimately produced and 
marketed. For a decision in a case such as this to be anything other than an 
advisory opinion, the plaintiff must establish that the product presented to the 
court is the same product which will be produced if a declaration of 
noninfringement is obtained.  
 
Int'l Harvester Co., 623 F.2d at 1216; accord Infinitech, Inc. v. Vitrophage, Inc., 847 F. Supp, 332, 
336 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
21.  Phillips Plastics Corp. v. Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha, 57 F.3d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 
The purpose of the declaratory action is to permit a threatened party to resolve 
its potential liability, but only when the relationship has progressed to an actual 
controversy, as required by Article III of the Constitution.  Although access to 
declaratory procedures in patent cases does not necessarily require an explicit 
threat of suit, to create an actual controversy there must be more than ongoing 
license negotiations.  There must be action by the patent holder sufficient to 
create an objectively reasonable apprehension that suit will be brought against 
the declaratory plaintiff. 
Id. 
22.  “The ‘reasonable apprehension of suit’ test requires more than the nervous state of mind 
of a possible infringer; it requires that the objective circumstances support such an apprehension” Id. 
at 1053–54; accord Indium Corp. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 883 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
23.  Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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relationship between the parties,24 and the contact and negotiations between 
parties with regards to the patent at issue.25  If express threats of suit are 
present, this is obviously a truncated analysis; however, absent explicit threats 
the court will evaluate the “totality of the circumstances” when deciding if the 
plaintiff was in reasonable apprehension of a suit.26 
B.  MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. was a battle among biotechnology 
titans.  Genentech was one of the pioneers in the field and focused its 
development on upstream genetic information.27  MedImmune, the licensee, 
was the developer of medicines used to treat a variety of diseases.28 
In 1997, the parties entered into license agreements involving two sets of 
advances by Genentech.29  One agreement was for an advancement that was 
covered by a patent that had issued prior to the license; the other was the 
subject of a pending patent application.30  When a patent issued on the 
pending application, Genentech sent MedImmune a letter claiming that the 
new patent covered Synagis, a drug that accounted for 80% of MedImmune’s 
revenue.31 
MedImmune was in a tough position.  To MedImmune, the letter was 
clearly a threat to terminate the license and sue for infringement unless a more 
beneficial agreement to Genentech could be reached.  MedImmune, however, 
believed the patent was invalid and unenforceable, and thus, not infringed.32  
As a result, MedImmune was faced with either maintaining the status quo, 
 
24.  Studex Corp. v. Blomdahl Medical Innovation AB, 355 F. Supp. 2d 3, 8 (D.D.C. 2004). 
25.   EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
26.  Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d 631, 634 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 272 (1941)). 
27.  Although primarily engaged in the same business, Genentech is now a subsidiary of 
Roche, Inc.  Being founded on the heels of the discovery of recombinant DNA technology, 
Genentech is considered the “founder of the biotechnology industry.”  Before being acquired by 
Roche, Inc., Genentech’s stock symbol was “DNA.”  See Genentech “About Us” Page, 
http://www.gene.com/gene/about (last visited Feb. 22, 2011); Genentech “History” Page, 
http://www.gene.com/gene/about/corporate/history (last visited Feb. 22, 2011). 
28.  Today, MedImmune is an LLC, and a wholly owned subsidiary of AstraZeneca.  
MedImmune “About Us” Page, http://www.medimmuneMedImmune.com/about_us.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2011).  MedImmune, LLC   has been the recipient of several governmental contracts 
for the manufacture of the novel H1N1 FluMist.  Vandana Sinha, MedImmune Gets Second H1N1 
Flu Contract, WASHINGTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, Jul. 13, 2009, 
http://washington.bizjournals.com/washington/stories/2009/07/13/daily21.html.  
29.  MedImmune v. Genentech, 549 U.S. 118, 121 (2007). 
30.  Id. 
31.  Id. at 121–22. 
32.  Id. 
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which would result in Genentech terminating the license and suing for 
infringement thereby exposing MedImmune to treble damages, attorney’s 
fees, and the loss of most of its business, or challenging the patent through a 
declaratory judgment action.33  At the time, the latter required MedImmune to 
break the license agreement themselves and suffer breach of contract 
damages; otherwise, an Article III case or controversy would not be present.34 
Attempting to pave new ground, MedImmune chose a third option—
paying the license fees and bringing a declaratory judgment action to 
determine the rights and legal relations of the parties.35  This failed in the 
lower courts when, sticking to the Gen-Probe holding, dismissed the suit. The 
Federal Circuit affirmed.36  It was concluded that MedImmune was a licensee 
in good standing, and accordingly, was not in reasonable apprehension of suit 
(RAS).37  Thus, the matter was not justiciable.38 
 
33.  Since this Comment will use a game theoretic framework to analyze strategic concerns, it 
is of probative value to outline, in detail, exactly what MedImmune’s options (and risks associated 
with these options) were:  (1) Do nothing—this would in all likelihood cause Genentech to terminate 
the license and sue for infringement, which would subject MedImmune to treble damages, attorney’s 
fees, and the loss of its primary source of business but would also subject Genentech’s patent to 
judicial scrutiny because MedImmune would surely claim it was invalid as a defense; (2) 
preemptively terminate the license and stop manufacturing Synagis—MedImmune had the right, 
under the license agreement, to terminate the agreement with six months notice, while avoiding 
treble damages and attorney’s fees, MedImmune would still lose its primary source of business; (3) 
challenge the validity of the patent through a declaratory judgment action—at the time, this would 
cause MedImmune to suffer breach of contract damages and force it to go through costly patent 
litigation.  See Id.  In option (1), MedImmune is risking the most; however, they may also gain the 
most by obtaining a judgment that the Genentech patent is invalid.  In option two, MedImmune is 
risking very little as the way of damages; however, is conceding it primary source of business.  
MedImmune also has nothing to gain besides cutting their losses in option (2).  In option (3), 
MedImmune can gain the reward in option (1) but is risking less—only breach of contract damages 
and the cost of litigation as opposed to treble damages, MedImmune’s attorney’s fees, and litigation 
costs.  (This will be graphically represented later in the Comment.) 
34.  U.S. CONST. art. III; Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006); see, e.g., 
Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2004).   
35.  28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).   
 
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United 
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and 
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or 
not further relief is or could be sought.  Any such declaration shall have the 
force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such. 
 
Id. 
36.  MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, No. CV 03-2567, 2004 WL 3770589 (C.D. Cal.); 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
37.  MedImmune, 427 F.3d at 964. 
38.  Id. 
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Upon review, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.39  Justice Scalia, speaking 
for the majority, rejected the Federal Circuit’s RAS test.40  The Court 
reasoned that the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act was to prevent the 
plaintiff from having to “bet the farm.”41  In other words, the mere fact that 
MedImmune was faced with a choice—risk the business or abandon the rights 
under the license—was sufficient to create Article III jurisdiction.42 
Overturning the second prong to the reasonable apprehension of suit test 
changes the field patent litigants play on drastically.  Now, the standard is 
whether there is a “substantial controversy.”43  When determining whether  
asubstantial controversy exists, a court should be guided by all the 
circumstances.44  This seems analogous to the previous “totality of the 
circumstances” analysis.45 
The effects of this new, lowered standard are still somewhat unknown.  
The Federal Circuit is still getting its legs underneath it.  However, there have 
been decisions since MedImmune, which do shed light on how the Federal 
Circuit will interpret the new standard.  The next section of this Comment will 
briefly discuss these developments.  This will allow for a more accurate 
framing of the strategic concerns to assist in the analysis. 
C.  Federal Circuit’s Response to MedImmune 
Since the Supreme Court’s dismantling of the RAS test in MedImmune, 
the Federal Circuit has decided several cases interpreting MedImmune.  Most 
notably, the Federal Circuit’s decision in SanDisk Corp. v. 
STMicroelectronics, Inc.46 and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Novartis 
 
39.  MedImmune v. Genentech, 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007). 
40.  See id.  at 132 n.11.  The Court concluded that the “RAS” test could not be reconciled 
with its decision in Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943), which it concluded was still good law 
despite being distinguished by Gen-Probe.  Id.  
41.  Id.  at 129. 
42.  Id.  Seemingly, this would be no choice at all for MedImmune since the patent in 
question would have covered a drug that accounted for eighty percent of MedImmune’s business.  
One could argue that this fact was a driving factor for the Court’s analysis.  In other words, since 
MedImmune did not have any choice but a lawsuit of some flavor, they were in what would be an 
equivalent state to “reasonable apprehension of suit.”  See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 13, at 698.   
 In MedImmune, the Court was presented with a particularly egregious fact situation; had 
MedImmune breached the license agreement to challenge the patent, it may have been enjoined from 
producing a product that represented more than 80% of its revenue and sales.  The Court noted that a 
party should not have to ‘bet the farm’ before seeking declaratory judgment. 
Id. (citation omitted) 
43.  MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 138. 
44.   Id.  
45.  Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 272 (1941). 
46.  SanDisk Corp v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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Pharmaceutical Corp.47 are illustrative of the Federal Circuit’s response. 
1.  SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc. 
SanDisk is a manufacturer of flash memory storage, and ST was a 
newcomer to the flash memory market.48  As a result, ST approached SanDisk 
in attempt to secure a cross-licensing agreement.49  During negotiations, both 
ST and SanDisk provided each other with an infringement analysis of their 
respective patents sought to be licensed; however, each party maintained that 
they had no intention to file suit.  Despite these assurances, SanDisk filed suit 
claiming that ST was infringing its patents.50  Incident to this, SanDisk sought 
declaratory judgment declaring the invalidity and non-infringement of the ST 
patents.51  The district court dismissed upon ST’s motion for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction because it concluded that SanDisk was not in reasonable 
apprehension of suit.52 
Upon review and in light of MedImmune, the Federal Circuit vacated the 
district court’s dismissal.  The court concluded that it has subject matter 
jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment action when the plaintiff disputes a 
defendant’s claim of right, and failure to recognize this claim would cause the 
plaintiff to risk treble damages.53  The court reasoned that an explicit threat of 
litigation is not a prerequisite for subject matter jurisdiction in a declaratory 
judgment action.54  The mere fact that ST committed acts that demonstrated 
its belief that SanDisk was infringing on ST’s patents was sufficient for 
 
47.  Teva. Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d. 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
48.  SanDisk Corp., 480 F.3d at 1374. 
49.  Id.  
50.  Id. at 1375–76. 
51.  Id.   
52.  SanDisk Corp v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 04-04379 JF, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 
44870, *16 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
53.  SanDisk Corp., 480 F.3d at 1374. 
 
As the Supreme Court noted, “the declaratory judgment procedure is an 
alternative to pursuit of the arguably illegal activity.” The Supreme Court 
clarified that, although a declaratory judgment plaintiff may eliminate an 
“imminent threat of harm by simply not doing what he claimed the right to do[,] 
. . .  [t]hat did not preclude subject-matter jurisdiction [where] the threat-
eliminating behavior was effectively coerced.” “The dilemma posed by that 
coercion-putting the challenger to the choice between abandoning his rights or 
risking prosecution-is a dilemma that it was the very purpose of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act to ameliorate.” 
 
Id. (quoting MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech., 127 S. Ct. 764, 773 (2007)) (internal citations omitted). 
54.  Id. at 1381. 
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jurisdiction.55 
2.  Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp. 
A New Drug Application for Famvir®, a herpes treatment drug, was held 
by Novartis.56  Novartis listed one patent related to the ingredient composition 
and four patents covering the methods of therapeutic use in the Orange 
Book.57  Notably, the composition patent was set to expire approximately five 
years before the patents covering the methods.58  Teva, in an attempt to create 
a generic version of Famvir®, submitted an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) certifying 
that its generic version did not infringe on any of the patents held by Novartis, 
or in the alternative, the patents were invalid.59 
In response to Teva’s ANDA, Novartis sued Teva for infringement of the 
composition patent.60  Teva brought a separate declaratory judgment action 
seeking the court to declare the method patents invalid.61  Applying the RAS 
test, the district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 
declaratory judgment action.62 
Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the Federal Circuit 
reversed.63  It reasoned that by listing all five patents in the Orange Book, 
Novartis claimed the right to file a patent infringement suit against any 
potential infringer.64  This, coupled with Teva’s certification of non-
 
55.  Id.  at 1381–82. (holding only that where a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on 
certain identified ongoing or planned activity of another party, and where that party contends that it 
has the right to engage in the accused activity without license, an Article III case or controversy will 
arise and the party need not risk a suit for infringement by engaging in the identified activity before 
seeking a declaration of its legal rights.).  It is of note that Judge Bryson, in a concurring opinion, 
agreed that the court reached the right decision in light of MedImmune; however, Judge Bryson 
voiced his concerns that the license negotiations in SanDisk were run-of-the-mill and that 
MedImmune’s broadening allows for a declaratory judgment action in “virtually any case in which 
the recipient of an invitation to take a patent license elects to dispute the need for a license and then 
to sue the patentee.” Id.  at 1385 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
56.  Teva. Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d. 1330, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
57.  Id.   
58.  Id.  
59.  Id.  
60.  Id. at 1334–35. 
61.  Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 05-2881 JLL, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 38649 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2005).  
62.  Id. at *2–3. 
63.  Teva, 482 F.3d. at 1340. 
64.  Id. at 1341–42.  The majority looked at the totality of the circumstance; however, it is 
unknown whether the mere listing of the patents in the Orange Book would alone to give rise to 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Id.  Judge Friedman, in a concurring opinion, concluded that listing in the 
Orange Book would be sufficient as long as Teva certified that it was not infringing on any patents in 
SMITH_COMMENT (8).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/2011  3:29:04 PM 
2011] MEDIMMUNE v. GENENTECH 513 
 
infringement and invalidity, gave Novartis the right to sue.65  The court stated 
“[i]t logically follows that if [submitting an ANDA] creates a justiciable 
controversy for one party, the same action should create a justiciable 
declaratory judgment controversy for the opposing party.”66 
II.  MODEL 
A.  Introduction 
One of the most powerful uses of game theory is its use of comparing 
legal regimes.67  This is precisely what this Comment aims to do: compare the 
pre-MedImmune and post-MedImmune regimes.  Specifically, this Comment 
will create a model to analyze the strategic behavior of the patentee and a 
licensee in a patent license situation.  To complete this analysis, three steps 
will have to be undertaken: (1) identify the players in the game; (2) identify 
and analyze the strategies available to each player; and (3) create payoffs for 
all the combinations of various strategies.68  After identifying these aspects of 
the model, a normal-form game will be constructed.  This game is appropriate 
when two players are interacting and must decide their respective strategies 
without knowing what the other player’s strategy is going to be.69  However, 
before this is done, it is of use to go over the assumptions of a game theoretic 
model.  Doing so will hopefully address inevitable criticisms of the model, 
without necessarily satisfying the critics. 
B.  Assumptions 
Game theory finds its foundational roots in classical economics and 
rational choice theory; accordingly, the assumptions of rational choice and 
classical economics attach.70  Many authors are critical of game theory 
because of these very assumptions.71 
Rationality brings to the table with it two assumptions.72  A decision 
 
its ANDA.  Id. at 1346–47 (Friedman, J., concurring). 
65.  Id. at 1341–43. 
66.  Id. at 1342. 
67.  See, e.g., Daniel Orr, The Superiority of Comparative Negligence: Another Vote, 20 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 119 (1991).  
68.  This procedural break down of game theory is presented in DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., 
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 8 (1994). 
69.  The game utilized in this Comment is commonly referred to as the prisoner’s dilemma, 
and was first discovered in 1950 by RAND scientists.  WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S 
DILEMMA 8 (1992).  
70.  See Baird et. al, supra note 68, at 46. 
71.  Id.  at 47. 
72. See generally JOHN VON NEUMANN AND OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES 
SMITH_COMMENT (8).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/2011  3:29:04 PM 
514  MARQUETTE I.P. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:2 
 
maker, or player, in a game-theoretic model is said to be rational because each 
player is assumed to be in pursuit of increasing his or her utility and each 
player is assumed to have stable preferences.73 
First, utility is maximized in a game-theoretic model by maximizing one’s 
payoffs.  For the purposes of this Comment, maximizing the payoff is 
equivalent to maximizing monetary payoff.  This is not always the case, 
however.  For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that a dollar translates into 
an equal amount of payoff for each company player in this Comment.74 
Second, each player is assumed to have consistent preferences that is the 
rank ordering of the payoffs for a given strategies.75  If player A prefers x to y 
and y to z, it follows that player A must prefer x to z.76 
C.  The Players 
There are two main players in the model presented in this Comment: the 
patentee, who is often the declaratory judgment defendant in cases where the 
validity or enforceability of a patent is being tested, and the licensee, who is 
the declaratory judgment plaintiff challenging the validity or enforceability of 
the patentee’s patent.77  In sum, the parties to a declaratory judgment suit are 
reversed from that of a conventional suit.78 
 
AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1947).  
73.  ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 3–4 (1997). In real life 
situations, the assumption of rationality will not always be satisfied.  Nevertheless, this assumption is 
central to game theory.  As Myerson said: 
 
we should be suspicious of theories and predications that are not consistent with 
this assumption.  If a theory predicts that some individuals will be 
systematically fooled or led into making costly mistakes, than this theory will 
tend to lose its validity when the individuals learn . . . to better understand the 
situation. 
 
Id. at 5. 
74.  Maximizing utility does not always equate to maximizing monetary payoffs because it is 
difficult to measure utility in currency. For example, an individual may get more value from an 
increased monetary payoff when he or she is poor than if he or she is rich.  Accordingly, for 
individuals, measuring utility as a function of monetary payoff may be non-linear or heteroskedastic. 
This is less true of corporations, who seek to maximize payoff of shareholders.  See generally John 
W. Pratt, Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large, 32 ECONOMETRICA 122 (1964).  
75.  JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES 15 (1982). 
76.  Id. 
77.  See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); SanDisk Corp v. 
STMicroelectronics, Inc, 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Teva. Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis 
Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d. 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc. 359 F.3d 1376, 1379 
(Fed. Cir. 2004).   
78.  Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). 
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In the game-theoretic model presented, it will be assumed that the 
patentee and the licensee are already parties to a license agreement.  There are 
many strategies that a patentee or a licensee may undertake when negotiating 
a license.79  These strategies would needlessly complicate this model, and 
accordingly, are not addressed. 
D.  Strategies and Pay-Offs 
The strategies and the associated payoffs for each strategy are central to 
any normal form game.80  Here, each player will have two different strategies 
available to them: “Do Nothing” and “Challenge.”  While the strategies will 
be named the same for each player, the Challenge strategy for each player is 
very different.  The following subsections discuss the strategies in more detail 
and explain their payoffs for both the pre-MedImmune and post-MedImmune 
legal regimes. 
Before examining any strategy in depth, it is important to layout some 
background information of the game.  As discussed earlier, the patentee and 
the licensee already have a license.  Since this model is examining monetary 
gains and losses, any value realized by the patentee or licensee outside the 
license agreement is ignored.  In other words, the cost of the license to the 
licensee and the revenue this generates for the patentee are constant terms; the 
actual value of the license to each party is irrelevant.  Accordingly, the cost of 
the license or its gains, respectively are the starting point for each party’s 
payoff.  Every payoff is a function of these constants.  It will be assumed that 
the remainder of the license will cost the licensee one hundred (100) units, 
and accordingly, the patentee will gain one hundred (100) units for the 
remainder of the license.81 
 
79.  See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Lawrence S. Pope, Dethroning Lear? Incentives 
to Innovate After MedImmune, 24 BERKLEY TECH L.J. 971, 991–1005 (2009) (discussing 
approaches to licensing in light of MedImmune). 
80.  Baird et al., supra note 68, at 8. 
81.  One hundred (100) was arbitrarily selected.  However, any number can be used because 
the rest of the payoffs are a function of this number.  While the results may differ with a different 
number, the model can be replicated with any number.  This model will introduce variance in the 
form of the probability of patent validity and enforceability, not the terms of the license agreement.  
Again, this would be incident to the negotiation of the license not the status quo of a given license 
agreement and is outside the scope of this Comment.  It is likely that one of the criticisms of this 
piece or any other piece using game theory is that it assumes too much.  True, the numbers are 
somewhat arbitrary; however, it must not be forgotten that this model is an abstraction of reality and 
it is not without its limitations: 
 
A model is a simplification of, and approximation to, some aspect of the word.  
Models are never literally “true” or “false,” although good models abstract only 
the “right” feature of reality they represent . . . . Any meaningful rules admit of 
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Finally, reexamination is not an available option.  This Comment seeks to 
illustrate the costs associated with the potential of increased litigation as a 
result of MedImmune.  Thus, it is assumed that reexamination is not available 
or is not a prudent strategic avenue to take by the patentee or the licensee.82 
1.  Patentee 
a.  Do Nothing 
The Do Nothing (DN) strategy is the simplest strategy available to the 
patentee.  This occurs when the patentee, in a license agreement, elects to 
maintain the status quo.  If the validity or enforceability of the patent goes 
unchallenged, the patentee collects its royalties for the license, and eventually 
the license expires.  As a result, the payoff for both the pre-MedImmune and 
post-MedImmune legal regime is positive one hundred (+100) if the licensee 
does not Challenge: 
Patentee (DN, DN) = 100. 
This payoff gets more complicated if the licensee decides to Challenge 
through the Declaratory Judgment Act.  First, the patentee will have to pay 
money to defend the validity or enforceability of a patent.  In this model, the 
cost to defend a declaratory judgment suit will be half the remaining value of 
the license, or negative fifty units (-50).83  This is added to the gains or losses 
that are potentially derived from a declaratory judgment suit initiated by the 
licensee. Pre-MedImmune, the licensee would have to break the license 
agreement and risk breach of contract damages.  Post-MedImmune this is not 
the case; the licensee can Challenge in a declaratory judgment action without 
risking breach of contract damages.  Here, the patentee will not be seeking 
 
exceptions, but we can ask that exceptions be justified explicitly, that their 
implications for the reliability of research be assessed, and that the uncertainty 
of conclusions be reported.  We seek not dogma, but disciplined thought. 
 
GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY 47 (1994). 
82.  It can be said, however, that litigants are increasingly using ex parte and inter partes 
reexamination as an avenue to challenge patent validity.  In 2007, the USPTO experienced a record 
number of reexamination requests.  Reexamination, however, is often used in conjunction with 
litigation.  For example, reexamination can be used to stay the litigation or overturn the litigation 
results.  Paul Morgan & Bruce Stoner, Reexamination vs. Litigation—Making Intelligent Decisions in 
Challenging Patent Validity, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 441 (2004).  Thus, depending on 
a given case, reexamination may be an additional cost that a patentee or licensee may strategically 
decide to take on.  In any regard, this cumbersome topic will not be discussed in this Comment. 
83.  Negative fifty (-50) again seems arbitrary, however, it allows for consistent testing of 
both the licensee’s and patentee’s strategies.  Since it is assumed that the licensee is rational, the 
licensee would not initiate a declaratory judgment suit that would cost it more than the remaining 
cost of the license.  The costs are assumed to be the same for each party in the suit.  This, again, is 
for the sake of simplicity.   
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infringement damages because this is the DN strategy.84  As a result, the 
payoff for the patentee pre-MedImmune would be: 
Patentee (DN, Challenge)85 = -50 + ((1- Ө)*100 – (Ө * 100)).86 
Post-MedImmune would render a different payoff because the patentee 
would no longer be able to realize gains in utility as a result of breach of 
contract damages: 
Patentee (DN, Challenge) = -50 – ((1- Ө) * 100).87 
b.  Challenge 
When the patentee Challenges and the licensee Does Nothing, the 
patentee is seeking to “lock-in” the validity and enforceability of the license.  
This may be done through a consent decree.88  In a consent decree the players, 
who have reached a license agreement, would subject themselves to a patent 
infringement or declaratory judgment suit.89  Subsequent to initiating the suit, 
the players would settle and the license agreement would become part of a 
consent decree terminating the suit.90  This would prevent the validity of the 
underlying patent from being Challenged because of res judicata.91 
The resulting payoff for the patentee would be a function of the cost of 
litigation, which would be reduced because of the cooperative nature, and the 
financial gains that can be realized by eliminating the need to set aside capital 
 
84.  See the “Challenge” strategy infra Part II(D)(1)(b).  
85.  The patentee’s payoff is a function of the patentee’s strategy and the licensee’s strategy.  
Thus: Patentee (Patentee’s strategy, Licensee’s strategy).  
86.  By convention, Ө is the probability that the patent will be declared invalid.  Since this is a 
percentage, it is multiplied by one hundred, the cost of the patent, to produce a utility amount.  1-Ө is 
the probability the patent will be declared valid.  Again, this is multiplied by one hundred (100) to 
receive a utility amount.  For example, if the probability the patent is going to be declared invalid is 
0.00 than the formula would resolve to: 
 Patentee (DN, Challenge) = -50 + ((1-0.0)*100) – 0.0 * 100). 
 Patentee (DN, Challenge) =  50 
In other words, the patentee would be guaranteed get the benefit of the bargain (100) minus any costs 
in litigation.   
87.  It is assumed, as it is in all these payoffs, that the license ceases to exist after litigation.  
This may not always be the case; the declaratory judgment plaintiff may choose to continue to pay 
royalties and use the patented technology; however, this is outside the scope of this Comment.   
88.  Dreyfuss & Pope, supra note 79, at 13 
89.  Id.  It does not matter who initiates the suit.  Id.  
90.  Id. 
91.  Id.; see also Am. Equip. Corp. v. Wikomi Mfg., 630 F.2d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 1980).  It is 
not known for sure if court will uphold these “sweetheart deals.”  Id.  However, courts have upheld 
them in the past, even in the face of Hatch Waxman antitrust challenges.  See In re Tamoxifen Citrate 
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 203 (2d Cir. 2006); Schering–Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056, 
1075 (11th Cir. 2005); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 
2003). 
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to potentially defend against a declaratory judgment suit: 
Patentee (Challenge, DN) = (100 – 25) + 35 
Patentee (Challenge, DN) = 110.92 
 These payoffs would be the same in both the pre-MedImmune and post-
MedImmune regimes. 
If both the licensee and the patentee elect the Challenge strategy, the 
payoff for the patentee would potentially increase over the Challenge strategy 
when the licensee elects to Do Nothing.  This would be the case when there is 
both an infringement suit initiated by the patentee and a declaratory judgment 
action initiated by the licensee.  The total cost of litigation would not be 
double the cost of litigating the declaratory judgment action alone because it 
is likely that many aspects of the litigation would be duplicative.93  However, 
pre-MedImmune, a win by the patentee would subject the licensee to treble 
damages for willful infringement:94 
Patentee (Challenge, Challenge) = -65 + ((1- Ө)*100 - Ө * 100)*3.95 
Post-MedImmune, the payoff for the patentee would be the same 
notwithstanding the treble damages: 
Patentee (Challenge, Challenge) = -65 + ((1- Ө)*100 - Ө * 100). 
2.  Licensee 
Now that the payoffs for the patentee have been discussed in their 
 
92.  This payoff merely demonstrates that the benefit to a patentee would have to outweigh 
cost of litigation for the strategy to be a legitimate and rational choice.  Intrinsic rationality, that is 
rationality within a given strategy, is assumed.  Again, one hundred (100) is the amount of utility left 
remaining on the license agreement, twenty-five (25) is the reduced cost of the cooperative litigation, 
and thirty-five (35) is the utility benefit that is realized from elimination of the threat of suit. 
93.  Throughout this analysis I give great weight to the cost of litigation.  This, however, is 
not without cause.  An American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) survey stated the 
median litigation costs from the commencement of the suit to the conclusion of discovery as $1.25 
million, and “[]inclusive all costs” as $2.5 million.  See AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 25 (2007).  For suits with less than a million at 
stake, the median litigation costs were $600,000.  Id.  For suits with more than $25 million at stake, 
median costs were $5 million.  Id.  Thus, it is not unusual for litigation costs to be between one-fifth 
and three-fifths of the value of the patent.  This does not take into account the value of the perception 
that a given company is willing and able to enforce their patents.   
94.  “The rule that a plaintiff must destroy a large building, bet the farm, or (as here) risk 
treble damages and the loss of 80 percent of its business, before seeking a declaration of its actively 
contested legal rights finds no support in Article III.”  MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 
118, 134 (2007); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
95.  The negative sixty-five (-65) represents the increased (but not doubled) cost of litigation 
of two suit, infringement and declaratory judgment.  The rest of the formula is the same as the payoff 
for Patentee (Do Nothing, Challenge) except the inclusion of three (3), which is a multiplier for triple 
damages.  The damages, which would be tripled, are “a reasonable royalty for the use made of the 
invention.”  35 U.S.C. § 284.  The license agreement value represents this reasonable royalty.   
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entirety, this Comment can now turn to the payoffs for the licensee.  Since the 
licensee is in a license agreement and paying royalties on this agreement, the 
payoff is representative of what the licensee can save in the event of a 
successful Challenge to the validity of the patent.  Again, there likely are 
gains in utility outside this; however, it is outside the scope of this Comment. 
a.  Do Nothing 
If both the licensee and patentee maintain the status quo and Do Nothing, 
the licensee will have a payoff of negative one hundred (-100) in both the pre-
MedImmune and post-MedImmune regime: 
Licensee (DN, DN) = -100. 
If the licensee were to Do Nothing, while the patentee Challenged, this 
would be equivalent to the consent decree discussed in the previous section.  
Accordingly, the licensee would have additional losses because of litigation 
costs; however, not spending money in preparation for future litigation would 
save the licensee some money: 
Licensee (DN, Challenge) = (-100 – 25) + 35 
Licensee (DN, Challenge) = -90. 
b.  Challenge 
When a licensee Challenges the validity or enforceability of the patent, he 
or she seeks to gain the right to use the technology without paying royalties.  
Consequently, pre-MedImmune, the payoff for choosing the Challenge 
strategy can be represented as the cost of litigation plus the probability the 
license is invalid multiplied by the remaining value of the license agreement: 
Licensee (Challenge, DN) = -50 + (Ө * 100 - (1- Ө)*100).96 
Post-MedImmune, the licensee would not have to risk breach of contract 
damages: 
Licensee (Challenge, DN) = -50 + (Ө * 100). 
In a pre-MedImmune regime, a similar payoff, with the inclusion of 
increased litigation costs and the possibility of treble damages, would occur if 
both the patentee and the licensee chose the Challenge strategy: 
 
96.  Notwithstanding the litigation costs, this is the inverse of the (Challenge, DN) function of 
the patentee.  For example, if the probability the patent is invalid is 1.0 (100%): 
 
Licensee (Challenge, DN) = -50 + (1.0 * 100 - (1-1.0)*100) 
Licensee (Challenge, DN) = -50 
 
In other words, the patentee would be guaranteed the benefit of the bargain (100) minus any costs of 
litigation.   
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Licensee (Challenge, Challenge) = -65 + (Ө * 100 – (((1- Ө)*100) *3)). 
Again, post-MedImmune the licensee would not be subject to treble 
damages: 
Licensee (Challenge, Challenge) = -65 + (Ө * 100 – (1- Ө)*100). 
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E. Bi-Matrix 
Now that the payoffs are determined, they can be represented in a bi-








97.  By convention the first number in a set is the payoff for the licensee and the second 
number in the set is the payoff for the patentee.   
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III. ANALYSIS 




 Under both pre-MedImmune and post-MedImmune regimes,98 when the 
probability of invalidity is zero, the dominant strategy for the licensee is to Do 
Nothing, while the dominant strategy for the patentee would be to Challenge 
as displayed in Figures 3 and 4.  In other words, when there is no question 
about the validity of the patent, it makes sense to take this off the table and 
enter into a consent decree.  More practically, and not illustrated by this 








98.  According to the model, challenging would be the licensee’s best strategy if the patentee 
were to “Do Nothing,” and the patentee’s best strategy would be “Do Nothing” if the licensee 
decided to also “Do Nothing” (as there is a payoff of 110).  However, it is unlikely in reality that a 
licensee would challenge a license if he or she knew there was no chance of winning because the 
relationship between the licensee and patentee would be damaged for only a small potential gain. 
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Under the pre-MedImmune regime, when the probability of invalidity is 
ten, the dominant strategy for the licensee is to Do Nothing, while the 
dominant strategy for the patentee would be to Challenge as depicted in 
Figures 5.  In other words, when there is little or no question about the 
validity of the patent, it makes sense to take the possibility of litigation off the 
table and enter into a consent decree. 
Contrastingly, under the post-MedImmune regime, choosing the Challenge 
strategy becomes more appealing to the licensee as depicted in Figure 6.  For 
example, if the patentee is adverse to litigation and not likely to seek an 
infringement suit, the licensee’s payoff would be maximized at negative forty.  
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Under the pre-MedImmune regime, when the probability of invalidity is 
fifty, it would still be prudent for both parties to enter a consent decree as 
depicted in Figure 7.  This is because the Do Nothing strategy of the patentee 
is dominated.  In other words, no matter what strategy the licensee chooses, 
the patentee would maximize its payoff if it chooses to Challenge.  
Accordingly, the licensee can predict the patentee would choose to Challenge, 
and accordingly, will choose the strategy of Do Nothing to maximize its 
payoff. 
It is a different story under the post-MedImmune regime depicted in 
Figure 8.  Here, the dominant strategy for the licensee is to Challenge.  
Regardless of what strategy the patentee chooses, the licensee’s payoff is 
maximized by choosing to Challenge.  As a result, the patentee will maximize 
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D.  Probability of Invalidity is Seventy-five Percent 
 
 
When the probability of invalidity is seventy-five, it would be best for 
both players to choose the Challenge strategy under the pre-MedImmune 
regime as depicted in Figure 9.  Regardless of the strategy the patentee 
chooses, the licensee would be wise to choose the Challenge strategy because 
the payoffs are always greater than the corresponding Do Nothing payoffs.  
For that reason, the patentee can predict with certainty that the licensee will 
Challenge and that it should also Challenge. 
Under the post-MedImmune regime depicted in Figure 10, the licensee’s 
dominant strategy is to Challenge.  Again, this guarantees maximization of its 
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Under both the pre-MedImmune and post-MedImmune regimes depicted 
in Figures 11 and 12, when it is certain the patent is invalid, it is prudent for 
the licensee to Challenge the patent.  Hence, the best option for the patentee 
would be to minimize costs by choosing the Do Nothing strategy. 
F.  Summary of the Model 
The difference between the pre- and post-MedImmune regimes is 
illustrated at the fifty percent invalidity level.  In the pre-MedImmune regime 
the patentee is theoretically safe from a declaratory judgment action. The 
post-MedImmune regime is different, however.  MedImmune made it rational 
for a licensee to haul the patentee to court for a declaratory judgment action 
when there is even a fifty percent chance the patent will be declared invalid.  
The same can be said for any greater percentage.  It is conceded that this 
model has its limitations.  However, it is illustrative of a greater point: that 
MedImmune is a shift of power to the licensee and a roll back of the nearly 
forty-year-old case law articulated in Lear v. Adkins.99 
CONCLUSION 
As illustrated by this model, the Supreme Court continued its assault on 
 
99.  395 U.S. 653, 673 (1969).  Notably, the Court did not expressly repudiate Lear.  Id.  
Instead, it merely differentiated the facts.  Id. at 769. This leaves open the possibility of equitable 
defenses and policy arguments.  MedImmune v. Genentech, 549 U.S. 118, 136 (2007). 
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the patentee in MedImmune.  MedImmune is one of numerous recent cases 
where the Supreme Court has assaulted the Federal Circuit and patentees.  
MedImmune, however, represents a particularly salient departure from previous 
Federal Circuit jurisprudence. 
The elimination of the reasonable apprehension of suit test lowers the bar 
for bringing a declaratory judgment action and allows a licensee to remain in 
good standing while attacking the validity of a patent.  This creates a gross 
imbalance.  The relative bargaining position of the parties changes immensely, 
and it is now almost of no consequence for a licensee to Challenge the validity 
of the patent.  Practically, this adds to the costs of entering into any license 
agreement, and thus creates a disincentive to do so.  Since many patentees seek 
patent protection for the sole purpose of being able to market their technology 
through licensing, this has a trickledown effect of curbing innovation.  Simply 
put, the overhead cost associated with licensing a patent is now greater because 
of the imbalance of power between patentees and licensees, which decreases the 
value of a patent sought to be licensed.  Unfortunately, MedImmune is just one 
of many recent Supreme Court decisions that follow the disturbing trend of 
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